Economics, Law, Philosophy, Politics

Markets Are Government Creations: A Resource Guide

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[Note: This post is unlike the other posts on the blog, for the reasons described here. It offers a series of very rough notes toward a historical sketch of the idea that markets are government creations — in other words, the rejection of the neoliberal, neoclassical, or Reagan Era idea of a conceptual opposition between government and markets. More specifically, it fleshes out the claim in an earlier post that the idea of markets as government creations has been widely accepted by legal scholars, yet largely ignored by academic economists.]

“[T]he market is rational and the government is dumb.” Dick Armey[1]

“[T]he self-regulating economy does not always work as well as its proponents would like us to believe.” Joseph E. Stiglitz[2]

The idea that government plays a constitutive role in markets, including classical liberal markets, is not a new one. But it has never achieved dominance in either public or academic debates about what we would now identify as economic issues. It has never gained the status of a widely shared assumption in the way that its contrary has—the notion of a conceptual opposition between government and the market, public and private. Here, I will offer a brief history of the idea of markets as creatures of government, partly with the simple aim of bringing together in one place the disparate legal and economic contexts in which the idea has been expressed.[3]

At least in the United States, the peak influence of the idea that government constitutes markets arrived a century ago during the Progressive Era, when the “legal realist”[4] and (intellectually related) “institutionalist economics”[5] movements rose to prominence in academic and professional legal and economic thought, respectively. Both movements reacted against the orthodoxies of late-nineteenth-century thought in their respective fields. In law, this orthodoxy is sometimes referred to as “Classical Legal Thought” (CLT).[6] In economics, the orthodoxy often goes under the name “neoclassicism.”[7] A more general term encompassing both threads of intellectual history, but also extending beyond them, would be “classical liberalism.”

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Politics, Science

Tribal cognition: a few additional notes

Free Photo: Tobacco Flower

In response to my recent post on tribal cognition as a barrier to reason-based political deliberation, a reader draws my attention to a 2012 New York Times Op-Ed. in which Cass Sunstein proposes a theory very close to what I called “tribal cognition”:

In the face of entrenched social divisions, there’s a risk that presentations that carefully explore both sides will be counterproductive. And when a group, responding to false information, becomes more strident, efforts to correct the record may make things worse.

Can anything be done? There is no simple term for the answer, so let’s make one up: surprising validators.

People tend to dismiss information that would falsify their convictions. But they may reconsider if the information comes from a source they cannot dismiss. People are most likely to find a source credible if they closely identify with it or begin in essential agreement with it. In such cases, their reaction is not, “how predictable and uninformative that someone like that would think something so evil and foolish,” but instead, “if someone like that disagrees with me, maybe I had better rethink.”

It follows that turncoats, real or apparent, can be immensely persuasive. If civil rights leaders oppose affirmative action, or if well-known climate change skeptics say that they were wrong, people are more likely to change their views.

In fact, a recent interview at Vox with Stephan Lewandowsky, author of The Debunking Handbook, suggests that many psychologists have already embraced Sunstein’s proposal. That is, they recognize that the perceived political identity of both messenger and message can influence whether someone is receptive to an evidence-based argument. In other words, it appears that psychologists studying political communication already view “cultural cognition” and (what I called) “tribal cognition” as distinct, and recognize that both can play important roles in thwarting reason-based deliberation. (In fact, the idea that people will be more open to persuasion by experts they perceive as sharing their values already appears in the Kahan et al. “HPV Vaccine” article from 2008 — before the Sunstein Op-Ed.!)

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