Economics, Law, Philosophy, Politics

Markets Are Government Creations: A Resource Guide

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[Note: This post is unlike the other posts on the blog, for the reasons described here. It offers a series of very rough notes toward a historical sketch of the idea that markets are government creations — in other words, the rejection of the neoliberal, neoclassical, or Reagan Era idea of a conceptual opposition between government and markets. More specifically, it fleshes out the claim in an earlier post that the idea of markets as government creations has been widely accepted by legal scholars, yet largely ignored by academic economists.]

“[T]he market is rational and the government is dumb.” Dick Armey[1]

“[T]he self-regulating economy does not always work as well as its proponents would like us to believe.” Joseph E. Stiglitz[2]

The idea that government plays a constitutive role in markets, including classical liberal markets, is not a new one. But it has never achieved dominance in either public or academic debates about what we would now identify as economic issues. It has never gained the status of a widely shared assumption in the way that its contrary has—the notion of a conceptual opposition between government and the market, public and private. Here, I will offer a brief history of the idea of markets as creatures of government, partly with the simple aim of bringing together in one place the disparate legal and economic contexts in which the idea has been expressed.[3]

At least in the United States, the peak influence of the idea that government constitutes markets arrived a century ago during the Progressive Era, when the “legal realist”[4] and (intellectually related) “institutionalist economics”[5] movements rose to prominence in academic and professional legal and economic thought, respectively. Both movements reacted against the orthodoxies of late-nineteenth-century thought in their respective fields. In law, this orthodoxy is sometimes referred to as “Classical Legal Thought” (CLT).[6] In economics, the orthodoxy often goes under the name “neoclassicism.”[7] A more general term encompassing both threads of intellectual history, but also extending beyond them, would be “classical liberalism.”

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Economics, Politics

David Brooks Is Trolling Paul Krugman

David Brooks’ column this morning can best be understood, I think, as a mischievous act of what the Internet calls “trolling.” The column, titled “The Center-Right Moment,” suggests that David Cameron’s electoral victory in the UK provides evidence that voters around the world are rejecting progressive economic arguments.

Perhaps Brooks is unaware that his fellow NY Times columnist Paul Krugman has been arguing for weeks that the Conservatives’ strength in the UK is based, predictably, on the economy having done well over the six months or so before the election? And that this economic improvement is not a vindication of the Conservatives’ austerity policies, but simply a recovery from the unnecessary economic harms caused by austerity? And that no one is pointing all of this out clearly to voters in the UK, so their embrace of the Conservatives cannot be understood as a rejection of arguments against austerity?

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Economics, Philosophy, Politics

Thucydides and the Social Sciences (Autobiographical)

Free Photo: Amphitheater at Pompeii

This post offers a little piece of intellectual autobiography that I hope will place some other posts in a clearer light — especially the posts related to the later Wittgenstein, and the posts on economics. For me, it’s a chance to sort out some of my current thinking by considering what preceded it.

There was a time, shortly after my first exposure to the history of economic ideas, following years of being focused almost exclusively on the humanities, when I thought that what the scholarly world really needed was a kind of new grand unified theory of the social sciences. All I look for from a social science — from any science — is an increase in the power to predict and control nature in ways that serve our purposes, whatever they are. The intellectual run-up to the global financial crisis seemed to show that orthodox economics, as practiced by the world’s leading economists, was failing by this standard.

And economics appeared to be at the vanguard of the social sciences. If economics was driven by “physics envy” — the scientistic desire to emulate the mathematico-deductive rigor of theoretical physics — then other social sciences, such as political science, seemed to be afflicted with “economics envy.” But the global financial crisis called into question whether the emperor was wearing any clothes. Under such circumstances, it seemed to me, wasn’t it worth questioning the reigning assumptions? Might it not be time for some revolutionary science?

Once I began reading about the history of economic ideas, along with critiques of contemporary economic thought, my enthusiasm for this idea grew. To begin with, the secondary literature on economic thought is full of persuasive critiques of the intellectual underpinnings of a great deal of contemporary academic economics, especially the kind practiced in “freshwater” economics departments and by business school professors teaching finance. The more one reads about rational choice theory and the assumptions of quasi-omniscient, hyper-mathematical rationality that dominate so much of mainstream academic economics, the more the field seems ripe for a paradigm shift based on a skeptical rethinking of the basic phenomena under investigation.

In fact, it occurred to me that the predictive successes of modern economics, such as they are, might be largely attributable to the fact that when one is investigating human behavior related to money and closely related subjects — the core focus of economics as a subject matter — the single most important factor in human behavior is calculated self-interest, or, as economists sometimes call it, “rationality.” When making money, people will generally try to make as much as they can with as little effort as possible; when spending money, people will generally try to spend as little as they can for the greatest possible return; and so on. If you’re trying to predict money-related human behavior using as simple a model as possible, a model based on the assumption that individual actors are more or less rational agents (in the economic sense of rationality) is probably your best bet.

But even if you achieve good predictive results with this model in the context of money-related activity, this success obviously does not imply that rationality will always be the most useful model for predicting human behavior, especially in contexts less directly related to money, or where we have good reason to believe that non-pecuniary concerns may trump pecuniary ones.

For example, when we try to imagine what contemporary American political life would look like if all the political actors behaved purely based on calculated self-interest — without gaming the results ahead of time by redefining “self-interest” to include all sorts of ad hoc preferences and motivations that we would not ordinarily view as “self-interested” — the thought experiment leads to absurd results. Do we live in a world with no voters, where politicians run for office without any ideological commitments, tribal affiliations and moral commitments play no role, and officials attract the public’s support by offering generous populist benefits, such as lavish infrastructure and a guaranteed minimum income, with no concern for the deficit? Not at all. Many of the central features of our political life are phenomena that one would not expect to see if the relevant actors were behaving purely as rational actors — unless, again, the idea of rationality is transformed beyond recognition or usefulness.

So, when one discovers that the rational choice methodologies of economics have expanded, perhaps based partly on economics’ scientistic allure, to other domains in the social sciences, the case for a new grand unified theory of the social sciences seems even stronger. If the use of rational choice theory in economics invites skeptical questioning, the use of rational choice theory in, for example, political science — in so-called “public choice theory” — can sometimes seem not only absurd but useless. What unexpected predictive successes can public choice theory claim, against the countless instances where its models would lead us astray? The same could be asked of many rational-choice-based forays into sociology, such as the study of family life.

Certainly, focusing on calculated self-interest may help to dispel comforting illusions about human behavior — for example, if anyone thinks that crime results from some kind of mental pathology, it could certainly be useful to show the contexts in which rationality helps explain crime. But how many comforting illusions are there left to dispel today? Hasn’t the Machiavellian assumption of cold, calculating rationality as the driving force in all human behavior become our own dominant illusion — comforting us not by flattering our moral characters, but by flattering our cold-eyed realism, our courageous perceptiveness and freedom from childish illusions — even where an equally tractable alternative model might yield superior predictions?

With these thoughts in mind, I asked myself: why doesn’t someone develop a better alternative to rational choice theory that can displace its imperialistic role within the social sciences? Why, for example, doesn’t someone follow the lead of Thucydides, who recognized the great importance of self-interest to human behavior, but saw self-interest as one only one of human beings’ three central motivations — the other two being fear and honor?

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Politics, Science

Syll, Krugman, and Models in the Social Sciences

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The heterodox Swedish economist and gadfly Lars Syll had a blog exchange with Paul Krugman recently that reminded me of some thoughts I’ve been meaning to post about modeling in the social sciences. First, Syll accused Krugman of not being a “real” Keynesian, because Krugman subscribes to the model-driven, orthodox-economics “John Hicks IS-LM interpretation of Keynes,” not to the true Keynesianism that passed down through Syll’s heterodox mentor Hyman Minsky.

Krugman offered his usual responses, noting that “Keynes said a lot of things, not all consistent with each other,” and that in any case, the important thing in economics — as in any field hoping to be a science — is predictive power, not faithfulness to some oracular founder.  Then Krugman offered a remarkably direct challenge:

And as I have often argued, these past 6 or 7 years have in fact been a triumph for IS-LM. Those of us using IS-LM made predictions about the quiescence of interest rates and inflation that were ridiculed by many on the right, but have been completely borne out in practice. We also predicted much bigger adverse effects from austerity than usual because of the zero lower bound, and that has also come true.

Now, what have those who declare themselves the true Keynesians had to offer? Has insisting that expectations are volatile and unpredictable been helpful in this context? Actually, if anything it lends support to believers in the confidence fairy. After all, if it’s all animal spirits, who are we to say they’re wrong?

Has declaring uncertainty to be unquantifiable, and mathematical modeling in any form foolish, been productive? Remember, that’s what the Austrians say too.

If you can show me any useful advice given by those sniping at me and other for our failure to be proper Keynesians, I’ll be happy to take it under consideration. If you can’t, then we’re just doing literary criticism here, and I’m not interested.

What surprised me — and I have to admit, disappointed me — was Syll’s response. He failed to offer any example of “useful advice” (good predictions) made by heterodox economists like Syll but overlooked by gadget-driven, orthodox “Keynesian” (i.e., not dogmatic right-wing neoclassical) economists like Krugman.

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Politics

What so few economists know, but nearly all the good legal scholars understand

Free Photo: Stacks of Tires in a Rubber Factory

Many of the blogs I’ve enjoyed most over the years feature recurring motifs. One of Kevin Drum’s hobbyhorses is the relation between the phasing out of lead in the United States beginning in the 1970s and the drop in violent crime over the last two decades. If a prominent article proposes an explanation of the fall in violent crime (for example, arguing that “broken windows” policing was responsible) without mentioning the possibility that Americans are less violent because they’re no longer being poisoned by lead at an early age, Drum will chime in. Similarly, Paul Krugman returns again and again, both in his blog and in his columns, to failed predictions of runaway inflation by commentators on the right. Whenever a new warning against “printing money” and the risk of hyperinflation appears, Krugman posts a response. Likewise, Sanford Levinson (at Balkinization) circles back repeatedly to the criticism of political analysts who fail to recognize the harmful political effects of the undemocratic, hardwired structural provisions in the U.S. Constitution, such as the malapportionment of the Senate, the selection of the President by the electoral college, and life tenure for Supreme Court justices.

If I were going to have a hobbyhorse, it would probably be the failure to recognize the role of government in the economy. Not the role of government in regulating the economy. The role of government in constituting the economy. Progressive legal scholars have been hammering away at this point for nearly a century, at least since Robert Hale’s “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State” (1923), but it has never gotten through to the public consciousness. It has never shaped the way that the American public thinks and talks about the economy. And that’s a tragedy for our national economic conversation.

One reason that the progressive legal scholar’s view of the economy as a government creation has not gotten through to the general public may be that the public (naturally) looks to economists for guidance on how to think about the economy. Unfortunately, even most progressive economists today talk about “the market” as something that exists in opposition to the government, rather than as something created by the government. Whether on the left or right, mainstream economists tend to share the basic conceptual framework of the Reagan era when it comes to the economy, the framework I criticized in an earlier post on Greg Mankiw.

Consider Joseph Stiglitz’s recent remark in Harper’s: “Of course, there is no such thing as a ‘purely’ capitalist system. We have always had a mixed economy, relying on the government for investment in education, technology, and infrastructure.” These statements may sound progressive at first glance, but they adopt some of the central and most damaging assumptions of the Reagan era.

When Stiglitz says that there is “no such thing as a ‘purely’ capitalist system,” he’s right–but not in the sense he intends. The reason there is no such thing as a “purely capitalist” (or “purely free market”) system is not that all modern governments engage in infrastructure spending and the like. The reason is that “capitalism” is not a concept that has an essence or a core. We can talk about pure water–water with all the impurities removed, water that is nothing but H2O. But it simply makes no sense to talk about “pure” capitalism if this means something like capitalism with all traces of government removed. Markets without government aren’t markets at all, at least not in any sense we would recognize today. If the government plays no role in the economy, then there are no property or contract rights–and surely private property rights are one of the features of every economic system that we would call “capitalist.”

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Politics

What would a progressive Milton Friedman say?

Or, to put the question more clearly: If a progressive today were to write a book like Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, what would it say?

The politics posts on this blog will be, in part, an attempt to think through some future intellectual directions for the American left. The blog occupies a relatively neglected but I think important part of the political conversation among American progressives. On the one hand, the blog is concerned with electoral politics and practical, plausible, short-term to medium-term policy changes—as opposed to the radical left of Occupy Wall Street, anarchism, and parts of humanities academia in the United States. On the other hand, the blog is interested in thinking about bold ideas that push at the outer limits of what is politically plausible in America today—as opposed to those center-left institutions that are more concerned with immediate electoral calculations than intellectual and political change. As Occupy Wall Street showed, the American left can benefit from radical voices; and there is always a need for tactical thinking by insiders about the next election. But this blog is concerned with different questions.

Before turning to the particular question at the top of this post, a little intellectual background. The next few posts offer a brief recapitulation of a probably familiar historical narrative about where we are now in American politics, and how we got here. You can hear variations on this story from historians like Sean Wilentz, essayists like GeorgePacker, lawmakers and reformers like Elizabeth Warren, economists like Paul Krugman, and many other sources of progressive thought.

In a nutshell, the story goes like this: The Reagan Era is drawing to a close, but nothing has replaced it yet.

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